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Sharing economy start-ups are claiming
legitimacy by drawing on notions of openness and, at
the same time, by adapting to business institutions.
We use the case of CouchSurfing to investigate how
openness, which has been part of the organization’s
raison-d’être, contributed in the legitimacy building
efforts and why it was replaced by notions of
profitability and revenue generation. Thus, we
contribute the concepts of legitimacy and legitimacy
building to the academic discourse of openness.
1. Introduction
Sharing economy start-ups were born out of
unprecedented developments of the digital,
networked economy. We view the notion of openness
as such an unprecedented development and present it
as an important aspect of sharing economy start-ups
in their efforts to legitimize their innovative business
practices while they are, at the same time, adapting to
existing business institutions [8].
Questions and explanations concerning the
economic viability of openness (e.g. peer rather than
hierarchically managed production, open rather than
private innovation) and sharing (e.g. sharing rather
than buying, reputation rather than contracts) has
been at the centre of academic discourse [8, 11, 21].
IS research has paid particular attention to the
analysis and design of new business models utilizing
openness, such as open source, open data and open
innovation, to their advantage [27, 24, 38]. Yet to be
extensively studied by IS scholars [28], the sharing
economy has also spawned discussions about new
business models based on the success of existing
digital service platforms [3, 10, 15, 29].
We complement and extend these economic and
business approaches by focusing on a remarkably
understudied domain - the rise of sharing as a socially
acceptable practice, which brings the notion of
legitimacy rather than economic viability to the
forefront [19, 22]. We demonstrate openness as a
discursive resource, on which sharing economy
platforms are drawing in order to build legitimacy
[23, 41]. Based on an exploratory case study about
CouchSurfing, we present our preliminary findings
suggesting that drawing on openness is not only a
viable way to establish the legitimacy of sharing
economy ventures but difficult to maintain in the
long run as established institutions of business join
the organizational field demanding compliance with
expectations of profitability.
This paper, therefore, contributes the perspective
of legitimacy and legitimacy building to the
theoretical understanding of openness in relation to
the sharing economy. Our preliminary findings raise
the question whether there is a lack of institutional
support for sharing economy start-ups and, by
extension, similar digital platforms to successfully
build legitimacy long-term based on openness.
2. Sharing economy and openness
The sharing economy serves as an umbrella term
for a diverse range of social and economic practices,
which, ironically, do not share a unifying
commonality that justifies their grouping into one
category. This state of affairs is due to the use of the
label “sharing” undiscriminatingly attached to
economic modalities, which have nothing to do with
sharing per se, such as short-term B2C rental services
(e.g. DriveNow) or peer-to-peer rental of private
property (e.g. Airbnb), to name but only a few [3]. As
a consequence, these modalities become confounded
with sharing proper – that is, the nonreciprocal
practice of collaboratively producing, distributing
and consuming underutilized goods without invoking
the transfer of individual ownership [7]. Indeed, the
literature on the sharing economy positions “sharing”
at the confluence of three different types of social
practice [28]; 1) sharing jointly owned goods, such as
open source code [5], 2) exchanging gifts, such as
sharing digital music collections through file-sharing
platforms [18] and 3) renting assets and goods
provided by private individuals or businesses, such as
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car- and flat-sharing, better referred to as access-
based consumption [3].
Underneath the excessive and, at times,
inappropriate use of the term sharing, scholars
identify a global cultural trend transforming the core
values of the consumer society from individual
ownership towards more sustainable consumption
behaviours driven by environmental consciousness as
well as lower costs of renting and sharing relative to
purchasing underutilized goods [5, 29]. Suffice it to
say, sharing practices, such as sharing a hammer
among neighbours, is far from being a new
phenomenon [11, 15]. However, the combination of
recent technological and cultural developments,
referred to as Web 2.0, is deemed to extend the
notion of sharing beyond the confines of locally
embedded practice and personal relationships of trust
and familiarity [5], ultimately lowering transaction
costs by such a degree that sharing with strangers
becomes a viable alternative economic modality to
markets and firms [20, 7].
Viewed in this light, parallels can be drawn to
research conducted in the purview of openness as
both notions (openness and sharing) draw on similar,
if not the same, conceptual roots. For instance, the
peer-production of open source software (OSS),
based on principles of voluntary contribution,
community values and non-proprietary innovation,
clearly relates to sharing in the sense of commonly
owned means of production [8, 16]. The concept of
the sharing economy simply extends the principles of
peer-production towards collaborative forms of
consumption [25, 11]. Thus conceived, Wikipedia,
for instance, is not only peer-produced but its
consumption openly shared by the public at large [1].
An important difference to consider is the nature
of the goods and resources. Openness is primarily
associated with digital information goods (e.g. source
code or online encyclopaedias) whose non-rivalrous
and non-depletable nature serves to explain the
unprecedented success of open phenomena and the
challenge they pose to traditional market- and firm-
based coordination [8]. The sharing economy, by
contrast, involves also rivalrous, sometimes even
depletable, goods. One shares, for instance,
accommodation based on a pricing system and
market mechanisms resulting in the commodification
of sharing [25, 34]. This form of access-based
consumption has become a major theme of the
sharing economy discourse and, thus, caters to
privately owned and rented goods contradicting the
kinds of non-proprietary peer-production and -
consumption mechanisms the notion of openness is
associated with.
Given above difference, digital service platforms,
such as Airbnb or Uber, have established themselves
as 3rd party intermediaries coordinating market
transactions for the consumption of idle capacities of
rivalrous, privately owned goods [39]. Key to these
platforms are reputation systems based on peer-
reviews of their user bases, which mitigate the moral
hazard of transacting with strangers [12]. The
effectiveness of said reputation systems and,
consequently, the attractiveness of the services they
help coordinate rely on a critical mass of users in
order to profit from network effects and to mitigate
erroneous or even malicious reviews and behaviours
[11]. Hence, the peer-reviewing process leads to the
emergence of reputation as a viable, self-regulatory
coordination mechanism [33].
2.1 Legitimacy and the sharing economy
Legitimacy refers to the appropriateness of a
social practice with regards to contextual values,
norms, rules and laws, which are accepted and
enforced by some group of observers, such as
regulatory bodies, customers or mass media [37].
Drawing on institutional theory, organizations are
more than trivial machines making decisions based
on rational means-ends calculations but rather based
on a mix of institutional regimes demanding
alignment, compliance and congruence [35, 14].
Hence, the current popularity of sharing services
cannot be explained through transaction costs
calculations only but has to be understood in the
context of a society, in which sharing and, by
extension, specialized digital sharing platforms are
observed as increasingly legitimate ways to organize
transactions [5].
The switch from economic viability to
institutional legitimacy leads to a few subtle but
significant conceptual changes that need to be taken
into account. To begin with, “shareability” is not to
be seen as an inherent attribute of goods derived from
their idle capacities, as proposed in some of the
literature [7], but rather as a socially constructed and
historical category [40]. Allowing total strangers to
sleep on one’s couch, for instance, is not a direct
product of the couch being underutilized but based on
social structures, which make this kind of behaviour
meaningful and acceptable to begin with. Second,
sharing is not necessarily an expression of a moral,
socially responsible economy [19, 11]. For instance,
there are blatant power asymmetries created by
digital service platforms, such as between Uber (as
the owner and operator of the ride-sharing platform)
setting all the rules and reaping most of the benefits
and their drivers (as the quasi self-employed users of
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the service) providing the actual services and also
bearing most of the risks [25, 9]. Finally, new
ventures of the sharing economy need to build
legitimacy in existing institutional landscapes [41]. A
telling example is Airbnb facing banishment by the
city of Berlin, who is attempting to maintain
affordable housing [31], and accused by the hotel
industry to be an unfair competition circumventing
regulations [13].
Established businesses, who are experimenting
with sharing services, do not face the same
challenges since they abide by the existing rules and
draw on their existing legitimacy. Car manufacturer
Daimler, for instance, offers a short-term car-rental
service named car2go [15]. Despite being called a
car-sharing service, car2go is a straight-forward,
legitimate car-rental business that is in compliance
with standard business logics and regulatory regimes
of renting products for a price. The new start-ups of
the sharing economy (e.g. CouchSurfing, Airbnb,
Uber, Lyft), by contrast, are born out of
unprecedented developments of the digital economy
and, we submit, are drawing on openness as part of
their raison d'être and legitimization efforts.
2.2 Building legitimacy
Organizations are strategically engaged in
shaping their status as a legitimate actor by 1)
changing themselves in order to conform with
existing institutions and 2) by changing the
environment they are operating in [41, 4]. New
ventures are struggling with the “liability of
newness” as they are finding a balance between
gaining legitimacy according to established rules and
norms while, at the same time, maintaining their
differentiating characteristics that initiated the launch
of the venture in the first place [36]. Research
suggests that some practices should seek conformity
(e.g. accounting), while new practices should be
developed into a novel trend or fashion (e.g. sharing
as a global trend of the Web 2.0), by which the
institutional environment becomes fascinated and
susceptible to accepting the claim for legitimacy
made by the new venture [41].
For our analytical purposes, we build on
Suchman’s [37] three strategies of building
legitimacy, which were extended by a fourth strategy
(creation) by Zimmerman and Zeitz [41];
1) Conformance is the simple strategy of playing
by the rules without challenging or violating them.
For instance, Uber only accepts drivers whose cars
comply with national traffic regulations.
2) Selection refers to the geographical as well as
strategic positioning of the start-up in an environment
that is favourable to the new venture. For instance,
Airbnb (like many other sharing economy start-ups)
is headquartered in San Francisco in order to benefit
from the entrepreneurial culture of Silicon Valley and
the availability of financial as well as intellectual
resources.
3) Manipulation denotes active efforts by new
ventures to change the institutional landscape. For
instance, the interest group “collaborative economy
industry”, formed by 47 leading sharing economy
ventures, actively lobbies European Union agencies
to remove regulatory obstacles impeding their
business models.
4) Creation of a new social context and
institutional landscape, which can result in the
emergence of a new industry. This strategy is closely
linked to the research domain and practice of
institutional entrepreneurship [41]. For instance,
Californian legislators have created the new category
of “transportation network companies” to cater for
the rise of ride-sharing ventures such as Uber and
Lyft in contrast to taxi and limousine services.
The combination of these strategies unfolds a
complex tapestry of possibilities for organizations to
find a balance between following, changing, violating
and creating institutional structures. Conforming to
one set of social expectations may mean to disregard
other sets of social expectations [41] or even to shift
back and forth between different institutions and their
understanding of acceptable behaviour [23].
New ventures can gain legitimacy by, for
instance, mimicking standards, demonstrating
popularity and success, displaying symbolic gestures
of moral integrity or advertising new services, just to
name but a few [37]. In case of digital economy
ventures, in particular, utilizing the latest
technological developments, such as social media,
mobile internet or big data, signals technological
mastery and displays the ability to provide state-of-
the-art digital services that are convenient and
sophisticated and address or even create new markets
and user demands [28]. As discussed above, new
ventures can, thus, create fascination with their
products and services and construct a narrative of
technological progress and innovation, which can
grant legitimacy.
Given above conceptualization, the primary goal
of legitimacy building is to convince relevant groups
of observers of the appropriateness of new social
practices. Legitimacy is a discursively constructed
social phenomenon [32]. Thus conceived, the sharing
economy, as an industry, and sharing economy
platforms, as new ventures, are employing discursive
means in order to justify their existence. Placed
against this backdrop, the purpose of this paper is to
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understand openness not as a socio-technical
phenomenon per se but rather as part of the
legitimacy built by sharing economy ventures.
3. Methodology
The following study is part of a larger, ongoing
research project about the legitimization of sharing
and the sharing economy. The particular research
interest on openness as an aspect of the legitimacy
being built by sharing economy platforms is the
result of an unexpected discovery that led us to
initiate an exploratory, qualitative case study in order
to investigate further [6]. We purposefully selected
CouchSurfing because of its well-known history of
utilizing openness and peer-production during its
early days (see case analysis below). As this paper is
being written, the case study is still in its early stages
and we present preliminary findings and proposals
for future research.
CouchSurfing (CS) is the popular online service
coordinating the sharing of idle couches amongst
travellers and is frequently referred to as a
quintessential sharing economy platform. Given our
research domain of legitimacy building, we focus our
analysis on how CouchSurfing presents itself and is
perceived by relevant groups of observers in the
public sphere approached as a discursive site where
new ventures can make claims for legitimacy and the
appropriateness of their practices is being observed.
Our data corpus is constructed according to a
gradually developed sampling structure, which is a
recommended procedure for exploratory research by
focusing on understanding a phenomenon of interest
in terms of variety rather than representativity [26].
We elicited public statements and documents, since
these were created for the purpose of providing
justifications for decisions made by CouchSurfing
giving insight into claims for legitimacy as well as
into the reception of those claims by relevant
observers.
In more detail, we draw on the following data
sources to maximize variety in our empirical data
(see Table 1);
(1) CouchSurfing’s perspective as expressed on
its official website, official blog and one of the
founder’s personal blog. Some documents were
downloaded from alternative sources, primarily
bloggers, who kept copies and screenshots of original
CouchSurfing announcements (especially from the
non-profit era) since deleted from the platform.
(2) The perspective of relevant groups of
observers (i.e. policy makers, users, technology and
business experts) as reported in online news outlets
and blogs dedicated to technology and
entrepreneurship, which were identified by searching
for the keyword “couchsurfing” on techmeme.com,
the leading online tech-news and –blog aggregator
[2]. As our understanding of the history of
CouchSurfing improved, we collected further online
news reports to enrich emerging theoretical concepts
and questions by querying Google’s search engine for
“couchsurfing” in combination with terms related to
the sharing economy and the organization’s
evolution, i.e.: “sharing economy”, “social network”,
“B corp”, “founding”, “non-profit”, “for-profit”,
”Casey Fenton”, “Daniel/Dan Hoffer”, “Tony
Espinoza” and “Jennifer/Jen Billock” respectively;
(3) Dissatisfied users protested against various
major changes of practices at CouchSurfing (see case
analysis below) by organizing two online petitions on
change.org in 2011 and 2014 as well as a protest
event on Facebook in 2012. All the comments of the
signatories of the petitions and Facebook posts of the
protesters were collected;
(4) Secondary data published in academic articles
was searched for on EBSCO using the term
“couchsurfing”.
Table 1. Data corpus
Data source # documents
(1) CouchSurfing’s perspective
- Official blog entries
http://blog.couchsurfing.com






(2) Relevant groups of observers
- Online news reports and commentaries
techmeme.com and Google search
29
(3) User protests
- opencouchsurfing.org, blog entries




- Facebook protest page (2012), posts
https://www.facebook.com/events/
134863673334252/








- Published research articles 16
As our first step of the analysis, we constructed a
detailed historical account of CouchSurfing in order
to understand the identity and makeup of the service
and the changes the service went through since its
inception. We then openly coded paragraphs
extracted from the documents and organized them
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according to 2nd order themes we identified during
the analysis. We then conducted a more focused
thematic analysis following the four strategies of
legitimacy building, which was complemented by
memos forming the core of our thick description in
our case analysis below [17].
4. A brief history of CouchSurfing
CouchSurfing was founded by Casey Fenton,
Daniel Hoffer, Sebastien Giao Le Tuan and Leonardo
Bassani da Silveira in 2003 as an online hospitality
platform (www.couchsurfing.com) coordinating peer-
to-peer, short-term and free-of-charge
accommodation amongst its members. The essential
characteristics of the platform can be summarized as
follows; first, the members are engaged in a gift
economy, since travellers are expected to reciprocate
staying at a host’s private home for free by cooking
or helping out with housework. Second, the
coordination between members is according to a
peer-to-peer reputation system based on reviews by
and about travellers and hosts complemented by an
ID verification service offered by CouchSurfing.
Third, CouchSurfing presents itself as an enabler of
an alternative form of tourism that focuses on
authentic experiences and the creation of a global
community fostering “cultural exchange and mutual
respect” (couchsurfing.com). Thus conceived,
CouchSurfing displays the core features of what has
come to be known as the sharing economy and is
perceived as an early and important force thereof
(fastcompany.com, 2011).
4.1 Non-profit era (2003-2011)
CouchSurfing was founded as a non-profit
organization in New Hampshire, USA, relying on a
growing core of enthusiasts for voluntary work to
develop the platform. Until 2011, the venture was
almost exclusively run by these amateur enthusiasts
and the local collectives they formed engaged in all
aspects of the venture’s operations – be it events
planning, communication or coding (Gigaom.com,
2015). Revenues were only generated by one-time
donations of 25$, when members voluntarily agreed
to verify their identity. Beyond the core enthusiasts,
the user base grew slowly (reaching 45.000 members
in two years)1 but steadily until the collectively-
coded website became overburdened by the amount
of traffic, which led to a highly significant event in
1 Since official statistics are unavailable, user numbers are drawn
from unverified, secondary sources and are only indicative.
June 2006 (number of users had doubled by then) that
has become part of the mythology and identity of
CouchSurfing (Techcrunch, 2006).
The combination of a server failure, hard drive
and database crashes and erroneous backups resulted
in the irretrievable loss of parts of the software and
data. Despite the best efforts of founder Casey Fenton
and the, now legendary, Montreal collective, the
platform was shut down and declared dead by
Fenton: “[I]t’s been a fantastic ride. As devastating as
it is to consider, it looks like the ride is over”
(Techcrunch, 2006). However, following an inrush of
support mail from the users, the development team
doubled their efforts in order to resurrect the
platform. On 7th July, only ten days after the crash,
the completely new site CouchSurfing 2.0 (pointedly
named Phoenix) was released.
In the aftermath of the crash, many users donated
their time and volunteered to work on the platform as
new collectives were formed worldwide. To be
discussed in more detail below, it is particularly
during those days that openness became a significant
part of CouchSurfing’s narrative. Embracing peer-
production and open source seemed to be the natural
next step of CouchSurfing and vocal members, who
were expecting complete openness, expressed their
disappointment that restrictions were put on the
source code and decisions were made without
involving the community. By the same token,
members also complained about having to sign a
non-disclosure agreement. Some members left the
community out of protest and organized an online
petition dedicated to their cause to transform
CouchSurfing into an open organization run by the
community; the petition, however, was supported by
only 207 signatories (Opencouchsurfing, 2007).
4.2 For-profit era (2011-2016)
In August 2011, CouchSurfing’s application for
non-profit/charitable status was rejected by the US
government (CS blog, 2011). A decisive event in the
history of the platform, CouchSurfing was liquidated
and its assets sold to the private corporation Better
World Through Travel, which was later renamed into
Couchsurfing International, Inc., registered in
Delaware, headquartered in San Francisco and owned
by the founders.
Running a professional public relations campaign,
the founders/owners of CouchSurfing reassured the
member-base that the change in status would not
have an impact on the spirit of the service and
community. The efforts led to mixed results however.
While parts of the community supported the change,
others disagreed and believed that the management
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had betrayed CouchSurfing’s identity [30].
Volunteers, who had helped to keep CouchSurfing
afloat, felt that their work for the community was
stolen from them. A group of 3000 members
organized a protest page on CouchSurfing and an
online petition against the new legal status was
signed by 882 signatories (Inc, 2012; Change.org,
2011); concerns were raised about the lack of
transparency in financial decisions, the exploitation
of members, who donated their time and code,
privacy issues and the potential use of personal data
for profit generation.
Despite these controversies the user base kept on
increasing reaching 12 million users to date,
according to CouchSurfing. A series of investments
by venture capitalists (totalling 22.6 million $;
Venturebeat 2011; 2012) were used to improve the
website, add new features and develop mobile
applications (CS blog, 2011; 2012). However,
CouchSurfing was perceived to lack a sustainable
revenue model as 40% of employees were laid off
and “Tony Espinoza, a tech industry veteran installed
as CEO shortly after the transition, stepped down
after only 18 months amid rumors that the company
was going through an alarming $800,000 in cash each
month” (SFgate, 2014). Under the new CEO, Jennifer
Billock, management started considering a freemium
model, which was ultimately implemented, and to
sell advertising space in order to “begin creating
additional revenue” (CS blog, 2015) – a shift that
contradicted the promise made by Tony Espinoza not
to sell advertising space (CS blog, 2012).
5. Case analysis
The historical outline above already points to a
decisive shift towards considerations of business,
efficiency and profitability, which comply with
expectations of some relevant observers (e.g.
investors, business analysts) but contradict
expectations of others (e.g. open source advocates).
CouchSurfing changed its strategy for building
legitimacy from creating a new social context of
appropriateness (an alternative hospitality network),
to conforming to a well-established social context of
appropriate business practices.
5.1 Legitimacy by openness
CouchSurfing was one of the first and highly
influential drivers of what is now called the sharing
economy. Thus conceived, the early days of the non-
profit era can be understood in terms of creating
socially acceptable expectations that having total
strangers sleep on couches for free is an appropriate
and, more importantly, widely popular behaviour.
However, the creation of an alternative hospitality
network was not creation ex nihilo but rather drew on
notions of openness and the ideals of the commons.
Relevant observers accepted CouchSurfing in this
context as they compared it with other legitimate
open source projects “like Wikipedia […] – there
were armies of people invested in it who had
dedicated personal time to building it” (Gigaom.com,
2015). The environment became fascinated by
CouchSurfing and heralded it as one of “the best
examples” for people “taking the power of the
Internet into their own hands to create a new form of
global sharing” (Fastcompany, 2011).
Other aspects of openness were the cultural
values of cosmopolitan openness, in the sense of
being open towards strangers and cultural exchange,
which became the self-identifying attribute of
CouchSurfing as "a friend delivery service"
(Fastcompany, 2011). Thus conceived, open
participation was a key aspect, since the platform was
not only open for anybody to use but also to
contribute with regards to the operations,
administration and coding of the platform. As Fenton
stated in a video documenting the resurrection of the
website in 2006: “We need to make this collective a
do-ocracy […]. Don’t ask for permission, just do it
and people will let you know if it’s not right. Chances
are that just getting something done this way is going
to be helpful” (YouTube, 2011). During those days,
CouchSurfing, we argue, was considered an
appropriate venture of openness and its innovative
practices legitimate in the eyes of the emerging
CouchSurfing community as the relevant group of
observers who exerted joint ownership and, therefore,
shared the platform. “It was a community effort, and
the company’s non-profit status undoubtedly helped
it project the image that it was part of a hands-
around-the-world affair” (Gigaom, 2011).
Members dedicated considerable effort to
community work, when they organized local
collectives and provided useful features and content.
A feedback forum allowed members to openly
discuss and provide feedback about features and
policies. By the same token, the so-called “city
groups” were an important grass root initiative
providing content about a particular city, contact
details and other useful information resulting in
“something like a travel and activity Wikipedia of
each city” (Facebook protest page, 2012). Well-
regarded members could serve as self-selected
ambassadors acting as “official representatives who
set up events, fixed problems, and fostered the
CouchSurfing community in different cities”
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(Techpresident, 2013). Hence, CouchSurfing relied
heavily on community initiatives and self-
organization rewarding members with personal
prestige and reputation.
Given these observations, it is understandable that
CouchSurfing became known and accepted as an
open source project. For instance, when Espinoza
pitched CouchSurfing to a panel of experts at the
Travel Innovation Summit in 2012, he received
sceptical remarks from one of the panellist, Erik
Blachford, Venture Partner at Technology Crossover
Ventures: “When I ran into CouchSurfing a few years
ago, there was sort of a different feel to it. It was a
non-profit, everything was open sourced; the
community was writing the code, was doing
everything. […] It feels like a different thing now”
(YouTube, 2012). CouchSurfing, however, was never
conceived to be an open source project by the
founders nor did it ever become one, as the signing of
NDA agreements during the later stages of the non-
profit era testifies. Indeed, the peer-produced code
became a donation to the organization (rather than
owned by the commons), which was perceived as an
inappropriate practice by the relevant group of open
source advocates: “[This practice is] simply
ridiculous, it transfers all trade secrets from the
volunteers to CouchSurfing” (Opencouchsurfing,
2007).
Despite the controversies about open sourcing and
ownership, our evidence shows that CouchSurfing
successfully created a new social context of
appropriateness, which is now called the sharing
economy, by drawing on existing institutional
structures of openness and the expectations they
convey. This is not to say that CouchSurfing was a
truly commons-based, open platform itself as
complaints from disgruntled members from as early
as 2007 testify: “Right now, the “top” of the CS
organisation (admins) is a very closed and non-
transparent structure […]. We should be included in
every level of the decision making process and not be
considered just users” (Opencouchsurfing, 2007).
However, CouchSurfing was able to build legitimacy,
because it was perceived as something like Wikipedia
for alternative traveling and hospitality by relevant
groups of observers.
5.1 Legitimacy by business
The principle idea and peer-production of
CouchSurfing may have garnered fascination and
interest, but “its cooperative ethos backfired. Its
collectively-coded website couldn’t handle heavy
amounts of traffic. Bugs abounds and crashes were
common” (Gigaom, 2015). Hence, the change to for-
profit status and the attraction of venture capital that
came with it was positively received by industry
commentators. Issues with the website being
“antiquated” (Tnooz, 2014a) and failures to develop
services for smart phones (Tnooz, 2014b) were
consecutively addressed in the years that followed.
It is against this backdrop that the founders of
CouchSurfing justified their decision to become for-
profit; as Hoffer expressed it, the new status is
“enabling innovation […] and allows to take
investment money and be nimble and flexible while
sticking to our social mission” (Forbes, 2011).
Further justifications were based on the rejection of
the application for non-profit/charitable status
making it necessary to change; simply put by Fenton:
“Why are we making these changes anyway? The
short answer is; we have to” (YouTube, 2011). As a
consequence, it became illegal for CouchSurfing to
accept donations of any kind and the voluntary
contributions were appropriated by the newly
founded corporation.
In the wake of the change, CouchSurfing, Inc.,
shifted its legitimacy building efforts to Silicon
Valley in order to select a more entrepreneurial and
business friendly environment by moving the
headquarters to San Francisco. From a strategic
perspective, the corporation was keen to present itself
as a legitimate business by hiring CEOs “hammering
the organization into some semblance of
professionalism, efficiency, and money-making”
(Gigaom, 2015). Professionalization, in particular,
was a main goal at first by “hiring experienced
people at all levels of the organization, from the top
to the bottom” (CS blog, 2012) – be it engineers or
respected members of the tech industry like Tony
Espinoza.
By the same token, CouchSurfing also started
attracting considerable amounts of venture capital
(totalling 22.6 million $; Venturebeat 2011; 2012),
which was perceived to reflect the potential of
CouchSurfing to become a profitable business
enterprise. Still, right after the transition to for-profit,
concerns were raised about CouchSurfing’s ability to
combine its communitarian spirit with market
demands: “Didn’t you just embrace the worst of both
worlds? Now you have investors to answer to, and no
matter how warm and fuzzy they may be, they are
investors who will want a big return. Investors are
going to want to see a hell of a lot more user growth
than three million users over six years, and could
push the company towards business models that
could make that community balk” (Techchrunch,
2011).
Above quote from 2011 turned out to be an
accurate prediction of the challenges faced by
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Couchsurfing to claim legitimacy as a business
venture. With rising rumours about the lack of a
sustainable business model (which, ultimately, led to
Espinoza leaving the company), CouchSurfing
increased control over its operations. For instance, in
an attempt to control spending and maximize
efficiency, “widespread layoffs” (Siliconbeat, 2013)
were conducted “rumoured to be around 40% of
staff” (Tnooz, 2013). Besides demonstrating
efficiency maximization, CouchSurfing also
centralized control over the member-base. For
instance, the feedback forum was closed down in
February 2013 and replaced by feedback forms to be
submitted directly to the newly founded internal
Trust and Safety team for review. More importantly,
the city groups were shut down around the same time
as well and replaced by so called “place pages.” The
valuable information collected by the community in
these groups simply disappeared and, as vocal
members lamented, an essential aspect of the
CouchSurfing community with it. The move was
perceived by core members to “apparently demolish
perfectly functioning communities in order to
establish new, better designed, and more monetizable
communities” (Techpresident, 2013).
Finally, profitability has become a major issue as
the monetization of the platform has taken centre
stage since Billock’s tenure as CEO. In 2014, she
introduced a freemium business model via identity
verification. Instead of a one-time donation of 25$,
verification has been linked to an annual subscription
fee of 20$. The model grants premium services to
verified members such as no advertisement on the
website and mobile app as well as being highlighted
in search results (couchsurfing.com). Still,
CouchSurfing has not yet managed to convince the
business world that the service can generate profits
and, therefore, is to be accepted as a legitimate
business but rather is engaged in promising
opportunities for future profits. As Billock stated:
“What I can say to that point on monetization is that
Joel Cutler and Erik Blachford [the same person
referred to CouchSurfing’s open source roots at the
2012 Travel Innovation Summit quoted above], both
very accomplished entrepreneurs in travel, wouldn’t
be getting so involved [as members of the board] and
be so positive if they didn’t think there was an
opportunity” (Tnooz, 2014).
6. Discussion
The story we told about CouchSurfing revolves
around the shift from an amateur, communitarian
experiment drawing on practices of openness to
becoming a business trying to signal its business
legitimacy qua professionalization, control,
efficiency maximization and monetization. At a first
glance, our case study may be seen as a simple
change in strategy with regards to building
legitimacy. However, CouchSurfing refers to a messy
history with no clear-cut indication in terms of which
institutions conformance, compliance and congruence
is being sought. To some degree, such a complex
image of institutionalization is to be expected, since a
new venture of any kind conforms to some rules and
disregards other rules in order to overcome the
“liability of newness” discussed above [41]. Other
issues, we submit, emerged out of the peculiarities of
CouchSurfing’s heritage, which resulted in a tension
between tendencies for complete openness and for-
profit dispositions.
As we argued above, building legitimacy through
creation is never creation ex nihilo but rather a
recombination of existing institutional structures into
new arrangements of appropriateness. In our case, we
observe a mixture of various legitimacy building
strategies. To begin with, we provided evidence for
conformance with the practices of peer-production
and open participation – a do-ocracy, as Fenton
called it, that granted legitimacy to the innovative
idea of CouchSurfing as it conformed with the ideals
of online communities and cosmopolitan openness.
By issuing NDA agreements, however, CouchSurfing
violated the expectation of non-proprietary
innovation, which is a core aspect of openness as
seen by open source advocates. Peer-production and
innovation was not commons-based but rather treated
as donations.
The decisive event of failing to comply with the
legal requirements for non-profit/charitable status in
2011 launched CouchSurfing into the for-profit era
and the institutional landscape of business
entrepreneurship. At this point, we observe a
selection strategy towards building legitimacy as
CouchSurfing was incorporated in Delaware, an
enterprise friendly state, and opened its headquarters
in San Francisco in order to be part of the Silicon
Valley scene. This move resulted in meeting new
relevant groups of observers, most prominently
venture capitalists, and their expectations of
appropriateness. CouchSurfing had to build
legitimacy as a promising new business, by attracting
venture capital and respectable members of the board
as well as demonstrating professionalism, centralized
control, efficiency and monetization potentials.
Openness is an institution that can be drawn on to
build legitimacy as the appropriateness of practices of
actors, such as CouchSurfing, is evaluated based on a
set of shared rules and norms enforced by sanctioning
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mechanisms. CouchSurfing, we submit, overcame the
liability of newness qua openness; the highly
innovative practice of sharing couches online for free
was acceptable to the institution of openness, which
made CouchSurfing to be perceived as another open
project (as something like Wikipedia).
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Interestingly, CouchSurfing did not overcome the
liability of newness by complying with the rules of
accounting, venture capital, business planning and
other institutions one may expect a sharing economy
start-up would follow. Those expectations were
followed and met much later, after the innovation had
already occurred and the practice had accumulated a
critical mass of followers.
Our preliminary findings point to some major
implications for future research. To begin with, our
research raises the question as to why a venture that
started out as something like Wikipedia ended up
being not like Wikipedia at all. Certainly,
CouchSurfing was never conceived as an open source
project, but, one may be reminded, neither was
Wikipedia at first. In more abstract terms, we raise
the question whether there is a lack of institutional
support for projects to not only draw on openness in
order to overcome the liability of newness and to
create a new social context of appropriateness  but,
more importantly, to remain open long-term. Is, by
now, selecting well-established institutions, such as
business and law, rather than openness the viable way
to maintain long-term legitimacy? Simply put, are
Wikipedia and OSS just exceptions or even
curiosities?
Furthermore, our early findings also highlight the
complex assemblage or even synthesis of formal
organization and community involvement that seems
to characterize the sharing economy. This state of
affairs raises questions about the future of
organizational boundaries, membership and
ownership as illustrated by the conflict between core
CouchSurfers, such as community leaders, city group
moderators and volunteer coders, and the formal
organization represented by the owners and top
management. While these issues are quite well
known, the sharing economy brings new aspects and
practices into focus.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the preliminary
findings of our exploratory case study about
CouchSurfing. We demonstrated that the notion of
openness was an important aspect of the
legitimization efforts during the early days of the
platform, which was replaced by efforts to adapt to
the institutions of business. As a consequence,
CouchSurfing got caught between its heritage of
openness and the demands of profiteering.
We contributed an understanding of openness as
an institution that can be drawn on to create new
social contexts for innovation to occur and to
overcome the liability of newness; in more abstract
terms, creation of legitimacy is never ex nihilo but
draws on existing institutional structures – in this
case; openness.
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